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L Fas
On the night of March 28, 1992, Walter Mickens, Jr. ("Mickens") forcibly
sodomized and killed TimothyJason Hall ("Hall").' Using a knife, Mickens
inflicted 143 separate stab wounds to Hall's body.2 On March 30, 1992, Hall's
body was found face down on a mattress under an abandoned building? Scien-
tific evidence placed Mickens at the scene of the mnlder.4  Attorney Bryan
Saunders ("Saunders") was appointed to represent Mickens at trial
A Virginia jury convicted Mickens of attempted forcible sodomy and
sentenced him to ten years imprisonment on that charge.' The jury also found
ickens g of the capital murder of Hall, in violation of Virginia Code Section
18.2-31(5).7 During the sentencing phase of the bifurcated trial, the jury found
that Hall's murder was outrageously and wantonly vile and that Mickens posed
a future danger to society! Based on these aggravators, the jury fixed Mckens's
punishment at death.9
Prior to Hall's death, a juvenile court judge had appointed Saunders to
represent Hall on assault and concealed weapons charges."0 Saunders and Hall
nt once for approximately fifteen to thirty minutes to discuss the case." On
April 3, 1992, the same juvenile court judge noted Hall's death on the docket
sheet and dismissed all charges against himni Three days later, the same judge
1. Milckens v. Greene, 74 F. Supp. 2d 586, 590 (ED. Va. 1999).
2. Id at 591 (citing Mckens v. Commonwealh, 442 S.E2d 678 (Va. 1994)).
3. Mickens v. Commonwealth, 442 S.E.2d 678,681 (Va. 1994).
4. Id at 682-83.
5. Midek, 74 F. Supp. 2d at 600.
6. MiLeek, 442 S.E.2d at 681.
7. Id; VA. COE ANN. 5 18.2-31(5) 0ichie Supp. 2002) (defining capital murder as "[tihe
willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing of any person in the commission of, or subsequent to,
rape or attempted rape, forcible sodomy or attempted forcible sodomy or object sexual penetra-
tion-).
8. Midaim, 74 F. Supp. 2d at 590; swaso VA. CODE ANN. 5 19.2-264.4(C) (Mlchie 2000)
(requiring a finding of vileness and/or future dangerousness before a death sentence may be
recommended).
9. Midea, 74 F. Supp. 2d at 590.




appointed Saunders to represent Mickens for the murder of Hall." Saunders
accepted the case without objection.14 He did not inform Mickens or the court
of his prior representation of Hall." The court did not independently inquire
into the potential conflict.16
The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed Mickens's conviction and death
sentence.17 On appeal, the United States Supreme Court remanded the case to
the Supreme Court of Virginia for reconsideration in light of Simn v Sawzh
Qaranls The Supreme Court of Virginia remanded the case to the trial court
for resentencing.19 Saunders represented Mickens at the resentencing hearing. 0
Once again, a jury found the future dangerousness and vileness aggravators and
sentenced Mickens to death.2" The Supreme Court of Virginia denied Mickens's
subsequent appeal and petition for a writ of habeas corpus.22
During his investigation, Mickens's federal habeas counsel discovered
Saunders's prior representation of Hall when a court derk accidentallyprovided
him with Hall's confidential juvenile file.23 In his federal habeas petition, Mick-
ens presented evidence that Saunders's representation of Hall adversely affected
Saunders's performance." This evidence included Saunders's failure to raise the
defense of victim consent, failure to investigate into negative information about
Hall, and failure to inform the sentencing court that Hall's mother had filed the
assault charge that was pending at the time of Hall's death.2 The United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia denied ickens's habeas
petition after finding that his counsel's conflict of interest did not have an actual
adverse effect on his representation.26 A panel of the Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Crcuit reversed the denial.2" The Fourth Circuit en banc, stating that
Mdickens was required to show the adverse effect on representation and that he
13. Id at 600.
14. Id at 601.
15. Mi&ens, 74 F. Supp. 2d at 600-01.
16. Id at 599.
17. Mi&eom, 442 S.E.2d at 689.
18. Mideen, 74 F. Supp. 2d at 592; seSimmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 171 (1994)
(holding that trial court violated defendant's due process rights when it refused to instruct the jury
that, if sentenced to life imprisonment instead of death, the defendant would be ineligible for
parole).




23. Id at 600.
24. Id at 606.
25. Mi*ew, 74 F. Supp. 2d at 606.
26. Id at 615.
27. Mickens v. Taylor, 227 F3d 203, 218 (4th Gr. 2000).
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failed to do so, subsequently affirmed the district court's denial of relief.2" The
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.29
HL Hdd~g
The United States Supreme Court affirmed the Fourth Grcuit's denial of
habeas relief, holding that if a trial court fails to inquire into a possible conflict
of interest, about which it knew or reasonably should have known, a defendant
must still show that the conflict adversely affected his representation. 0
III. A mJsis /Applicahm w Vngmia
Mickens argued that his trial attorney's prior representation of the victim
constituted a violation of his Sixth Amendment right to assistance of counsel. 1
He alleged that the trial court should have determined whether Saunders's prior
representation of Hall created an "actual conflict of interest."32 Mickens asserted
that if the court found an actual conflict of interest, it was required to reverse his
conviction without a further showing that the conflict had an adverse effect on
Saunders's performance.3
The Supreme Court began its analysis by setting forth a framework of cases
addressing attorney conflict of interest?4 In Stricktariv Washi" 35 the Court
stated the general proposition that in order to succeed on an ineffective assis-
tance of counsel claim, a defendant must show that, but for his attorney's
ineffective performance, there is a reasonable probability that the result of the
trial would have been different.' The Court, in Unitai States vr C ic 3' recog-
nized that in situations of a certain magnitude, such as when "assistance of
counsel has been denied entirely or during a critical stage of the proceeding,"a
defendant need not demonstrate the prejudice required by Stri /arin order to
make a successful ineffective assistance of counsel claim.3s
28. Mickens v. Taylor, 240 F.3d 348, 363-64 (4th Cir. 2001) (en banc).
29. Mickens v. Taylor, 532 US. 970 (2001).
30. Mickens v. Taylor, 122 S. Cr. 1237, 1239, 1245 (2002).
31. Id at 1239-40; U.S. GON sT. amend VI (stating that a defendant has the right "to have the
Assistance of Counsel for his defence").
32. Mkkerz, 122 S. Cc. at 1243.
33. Id
34. Id at 1241-44.
35. 466 US. 668 (1984).
36. Se Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984) (holding that a reasonable
probability is sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome).
37. 466 US. 648 (1984).
38. Mide, 122 S. Ct. at 1240-41; sw United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659 (1984)
(discussing circumstances under which a defendant need not show probable effect on the outcome
in order to maie a claim of ineffective assistance of counseD.
2002]
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In Hdlowy v A kkasa and Or v Suidh, the Court limited the
circumnstances in which a defendant may fall within this exception to StriebV 1
The Supreme Court held in Haffomaythatf counsel has atimely objection
to his conflicting representation of co-defendants, a defendant has the right of
automatic reversal, unless the trial court found that no conflict existed.4 The
Court stated that defense counsel's opinion regarding such a conflict of interest
warrants deference because counsel is in the best position to recognize the
existence of a conflict.4"
The Supreme Court in QO& refused to extend the automatic reversal rule
of Hdknuy to a situation in which counsel did not object to his multiple repre-
sentation of three defendants in separate trials and the trial court failed to inquire
into the possible conflict." The Court reasoned that a defendant's representation
is more likelyto be adverselyaffected in situations in which counsel believes that
a conflict of interest exists.4" This greater likelihood of adverse effect must exist
in order for the automatic reversal rule to apply.6
Although the Curler Court did not extend the Hdouy automatic reversal
rule, the Court in OIer did say that when "the trial court knows or reasonably
should knowthat a particular conflict exists'" it has a dutyto inquire." However,
the Supreme Court rejected Mickens's argument that the trial court's failure to
inquire into his counsel's conflict of interest required automatic reversal of his
conviction. The Court held that the appointing judge's failure to inquire into the
potential conflict did not lessen the burden on Mickens to demonstrate that this
conflict of interest adversely affected his counsel's performance."
While the facts of Mideem are unlikely to arise again in a Virginia capital
case, there is still the possibility of an attomeyconflict of interest stem i from
prior representation of a member of the defendant's family, the victim's family,
a family member of a co-defendant, or a similarlyrelated individual. An attorney
has an ethical obligation to inform the court of any existing or potential conflicts
39. 435 US. 475 (1978).
40. 446 US. 335 (1980).
41. Midar, 122 S. C. at 1241-42; se Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 US. 475, 491 (1978)
(oldi that trial court violated defendants' right to assistance of counsel by denying defense
counsel's request for separate representation); Cuyterv. Sullivan, 446 US. 335,348 (1980) (requiring
a defendant to demonstrate an actual conflict of interest and that such conflict had an adverse effect
on counsel's representation in order to succeed on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.
42. Mideer, 122 S. C. at 1241-42 (citing HdlouA 435 US. at 488).
43. Hdltwy 435 US. at 485 (quoting State v. Davis, 514 P2d 1025, 1027 (Ariz. 1973) (en
banc)).
44. Midees, 122 S. CO. at 1242 (citing CG*, 446 US. at 348-49).
45. CQej, 446 U.S. at 347 (citing Hdaora% 435 US. at 485).
46. Mi&ei, 122 S. CL at 1244.
47. Id at 1242 (quoting C0 , 466 US. at 347).
48. Id at 1245.
[Vol. 15:1
MICKENS V. TA YLOR
that may affect his representation of a defendant. 9 In addition, the trial court




If a defense attorney has met his ethical obligation and informed the court
of the conflict, and the court does not inquire further into the conflict, the
defendant is entitled to an automatic reversa s1 If trial counsel fails to object to
the conflicting representation, and the trial court fails to inquire into the potential
conflicting representation, Mikeri firmly establishes that the defendant must
show the adverse effect required by 00&.2 The conflicts need not be so
egregious as those in Miceko5, Coje, or Hdloawy for these principles to apply, 3
Kristen F. Grunewald
49. HffourA 435 US. at 485. Seeeraay VA. SUP. Cr. . 1.7 (set i forth the general rule
regarding attorneyconflict of interest); VA. Sup. Cr. P 1.9 (stating the guidelines that an attorney
must follow when a conflict of interest involves a former client).
50. Qij/r, 446 US. at 347.
51. Hdforw.% 435 US. at 488.
52. Mi4*an, 122 S. C. at 1245; ste Cm*, 446 US. at 348.
53. Seegml]yMiaem, 122 S. C. at 1237; er, 446 US. at 335; HdlotwA 435 US. at 475.
2002]

